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Abstract
We oﬀer a novel view of employee discounts and in kind compensation. In our theory,
bundling perks and cash compensation allows a ﬁrm to extract information rents from employees
who have private information about their preferences for the perk and about their outside
opportunities. We show that in maximizing proﬁt with heterogeneous workers, the ﬁrm creates
diﬀerent bundles of the perk and salary in response to diﬀerent employee characteristics and
marginal costs of the perk. Our key result is that strategic bundling can lead ﬁrms to provide
perks even in the absence of any cost advantage over the outside market and to deviate from
the standard marginal cost pricing rule. We study how this deviation depends upon the set of
feasible contracts, upon the perk’s marginal cost, and upon the correlation between the agents’
preferences for the good and their reservation utilities.
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A typical U.S. worker receives a sizable portion of his or her compensation in the form of employee
beneﬁts (throughout the paper, we will use the terms "beneﬁts", "perks", and "in kind compensa-
tion" interchangeably). Examples include but are not limited to health insurance, maternity leave,
paid time oﬀ, subsidized meals and transportation, and on-site ﬁtness facilities. In a 2002 survey
by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, employee beneﬁts constituted 42.3 percent of company pay-
rolls. In addition, many ﬁrms oﬀer employee discounts on their products. For example, university
employees and their families often pay lower tuition than outsiders, airline employees travel for a
nominal fee, instructors at ski resorts use the lifts for free, and so on. According to a recent survey,
75 percent of workers reported that their employers oﬀered discounts, of 29.5% on average (Fram
and McCarthy, 2003).
The leading explanation for why ﬁrms include in-kind payments in their compensation packages
is that they have cost advantages in providing the good or the service.1 This would be the case
mostly because of tax exemptions, but also because of economies of scale, because the ﬁrm special-
izes in producing the good (the case of employee discounts), because it has enough bargaining power
to secure a discount from the provider (e.g. health and accident insurance), or because the good
is simply not available in the outside market (e.g., a pleasant work environment or paid time oﬀ).
An additional rationale given in the literature for in-kind payments is that they may enhance the
workers’ productivity, as in the case of free lifts for ski instructors. Finally, discounts and beneﬁts
could be just a manifestation of an agency problem, especially at the senior executive level.
These explanations are plausible, but do not seem to account for all observed patterns of perk
provision. First, not all of the existing non-cash payments are tax free and some predate meaningful
1See, e.g., Rosen (2000), who provides a discussion of the main existing arguments for the use of non-cash com-
pensation. See also Oyer (2004).
1Federal and State taxes. Second, the cost advantage theory predicts that the optimal amount of
beneﬁts is the one at which the marginal rate of substitution between the beneﬁt and money is equal
to the marginal cost of the beneﬁt. Thus, we should see all beneﬁts and discounted goods that do
not improve productivity being sold to employees at their marginal cost. This prediction, though,
appears to be often violated in practice. For example, some ﬁrms oﬀer company loans to their
senior executives, which are frequently at below market interest rates (Weston, 2002). Similarly,
universities that oﬀer free tuition to their employees’ relatives forego the revenues they could get
from regular, tuition-paying students.
In addition, the cost advantage theory cannot explain why diﬀerent categories of employees are
sometimes charged diﬀerent prices for the goods and services oﬀered by the ﬁrm. For instance,
in 2000, the employee discount provided by Federated Department Stores (which operates Macy’s,
Bloomingdale’s and other specialty retailers) was 20% for most employees, but 38% for senior
executives (Strauss, 2001). It is unlikely that the marginal cost of selling the merchandise to an
executive is considerably lower than the marginal cost of selling it to a lower ranked employee.2
Similarly, company contributions for executive versions of 401(k) retirement plans are typically
60% higher than for ordinary employees (Weston, 2002). Again, this does not appear to conform
to marginal cost based pricing.
It is possible that some of these deviations from the marginal cost pricing rule are due to
agency problems, but in many cases (e.g., free tuition, services and merchandise for rank-and-ﬁle
employees) this does not seem convincing. Moreover, according to a recent study by Rajan and
Wulf (2006), agency considerations do not seem to do a good job explaining the provision of perks
2It might be tempting to explain this diﬀerence in discounts by the employees’ diﬀering marginal tax rates.
However, employee discounts can be exempt from taxes only if they are oﬀered in a non-discriminatory way. Moreover,
an income tax can be thought of as aﬀecting the employee’s marginal willingness to pay for the perk. The standard
theory would then state that this eﬀective willingness to pay would equal the ﬁrm’s marginal cost of providing the
perk, which typically does not depend upon the employees’ tax rates. The tax advantage would therefore increase
the employee’s optimal quantity of the perk, but not change the price and marginal cost equality.
2even if one concentrates on the companies’ senior executive oﬃcers.
In this paper, we oﬀer an alternative theory of employee discounts and in kind compensation,
in which a ﬁrm may ﬁnd it optimal to deviate from the marginal cost pricing rule. We argue here
that the marginal cost pricing prediction is the correct one if the ﬁrm has full information about
the workers’ preferences and reservation utilities, but not when workers are heterogeneous and have
private information about their preferences for the perk and about their outside opportunities. In
the latter case, bundling perks and cash compensation allows ﬁrms to extract information rents
from the employees and this can be done more eﬀectively by deviating from marginal cost pricing.3
In particular, we consider a model with two types of workers. The workers’ productivities in the
ﬁrm are common knowledge, but their preferences for the perk as well as reservation utilities are
private information to the employee. The ﬁrm oﬀers an employment contract which consists of a
salary, possibly a quantity of the perk, and possibly a price for the perk. The perk could be an
employee discount or other goods, not produced by the ﬁrm, like health insurance or the use of
athletic facilities, as well as amenities such as pleasant work environment and other less tangible
forms of compensation. To account for the possibility that there may exist real world constraints
which prevent the ﬁrm from oﬀering a full menu of contracts, we consider two types of compensation
bundles. The ﬁrst type is constrained to be uniform across worker types in either the price or the
quantity of the perk, while the second is non-uniform and represented by a menu of bundles where
the employees self select into a contract. Our key ﬁndings are the following:
(1) The ﬁrm may ﬁnd it optimal to oﬀer a perk even if the perk has no productivity eﬀects and
the ﬁrm’s cost of providing it is higher than the price at which the employees could obtain the perk
3One of the perks enjoyed by the 150 lawyers of a Virginia law ﬁrm LeClair Ryan is that they can request funding
for personal projects that would "enhance their lives". The ﬁrm has approved funding for such things as family trips
to the Grand Canyon, the purchase of a piano and piano lessons, cosmetic surgery, a personal ﬁtness trainer, or a
week with family in a Zen monastery in France (Bacon, 2005). This example illustrates not only that there is indeed
asymmetric information between ﬁrms and their employees regarding the employees’ preferences for perks, but also
that ﬁrms care about these preferences and try to elicit information about them from the employees. Note also that
this example does not easily ﬁt any of the existing theories.
3in the outside market.
(2) If the ﬁrm is constrained to oﬀer a uniform quantity or uniform price contract, then the
optimal quantity is above the eﬃcient one for high marginal cost perks and below it for low marginal
cost perks. Moreover, in equilibrium, the workers may buy additional quantities of the perk from
the outside market.
(3) If the ﬁrm is constrained to oﬀer a uniform price contract, it will tend to charge a price
which is lower than the eﬃcient price when marginal cost of the perk is high and conversely when
the marginal cost of the perk is low.
(4) If the ﬁrm can oﬀer a menu of quantity contracts into which worker types can self select,
then the perk is provided in a more eﬃcient manner. Nevertheless, high valuation workers are
over-supplied when the perk’s marginal cost is high and low valuation workers are under-supplied
when the perk’s marginal cost is low.
Result 1 demonstrates that our theory is driven by economic forces that diﬀer from those behind
the extant theories of perk provision. The general message of conclusions 2-4 is that ﬁrms with
heterogeneous workers will typically ﬁnd it optimal to deviate from eﬃcient provision of perks, and
they will do so in a systematic way, depending upon the perk’s marginal cost.
We view our theory as applying primarily to perks oﬀered to workers in high skill jobs, because
it seems reasonable that when ﬁlling a job that requires a high skilled worker, ﬁrms select employees
based on their skills rather than on their preferences for perks. Once these employees are sorted
on skill, our model then examines perk design in the employment contract. Our theory therefore
ﬁts well with the claims found in the popular press that ﬁrms provide perks to retain and attract
high quality workers. For example, perks have been argued to help ﬁrms "attract and retain the
most talented employees" (Ryan, 2005), to help "recruit and keep good employees" (Irvine, 1998),
a n dt oh e l p" h o l ds w a yw i t hatop-tier work force" (Bacon, 2005; italics added). This emphasis on
4high skills as a crucial factor behind ﬁrms’ decisions to provide perks is not easily reconciled with
the standard theory, especially in the case of perks that appear to have no eﬀect on the workers’
productivities.
In its focus on the relationship between non-monetary aspects of a job and the monetary com-
pensation needed to attract workers, our paper is related to the large literature on compensating dif-
ferences, which dates back to Adam Smith, and where a good starting point is Rosen (1986). Much
of this literature is empirical, trying to document a trade-oﬀ between the job beneﬁts a worker re-
ceives and his monetary compensation (e.g., Brown, 1980; Montgomery, Shaw, and Benedict, 1992).
The logic of our results makes our work also related to the literature on price discrimination, for
example Oi (1971) and Mussa and Rosen (1978), and to the literature on commodity bundling,
where the classic contributions are by Adams and Yellen (1976) and McAfee and McMillan (1989).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and describes our main
assumptions. In Section 3, we formulate the general bundling problem and narrow down the set
of all possible contracts to three types of contracts that we consider to be of interest. Section 4
contains an analysis of the case where the ﬁrm is constrained to oﬀer a uniform quantity contract to
all worker types. Section 5 studies the case where the ﬁrm oﬀers a uniform price contract. In both
Section 4 and Section 5 we also discuss the model’s predictions. The case of a full menu of contracts
into which heterogenous workers self-select is considered in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2. The Model
Preferences. Consider a ﬁrm that needs to hire a single employee. The ﬁrm oﬀers a contract that
consists of cash and in-kind compensation and hires from a pool of potential employees, indexed
by n, each of them being one of two possible types. Type H, whose proportion in the labor pool
is πH, has a higher total and marginal valuation for the in-kind product oﬀered by the ﬁrm than
5type L, who represent a proportion πL =1− πH of potential employees. The utility that a type i
worker, i = H,L, derives from consuming quantity q of the perk and from a numeraire commodity,
denoted M, is given by the quasilinear function ui(q)+M, where the functions ui(.) satisfy
Assumption 1. a) ui(0) = 0,u 0
i(0) = ∞,u 0
i(.) > 0, and u00
i (.) < 0.
b) u0
H(q) >u 0
L(q) for each q.
Assumption 1a) contains the usual restrictions on utility. Part b) asserts the Spence-Mirrlees
sorting condition; it says that the marginal utility from the good is always greater for the type-H
agents than for the type-L agents.
Workers’ outside opportunities. The perk’s price in the outside market is denoted as po
and will be treated as exogenously given.4 This speciﬁcation includes the case where the employees
cannot obtain the perk in the outside market, for which it is enough to set po suﬃciently large. If





i,w h e r e¯ sn
i is the worker’s wage in an alternative employment and
ui(qo
i) is his utility from consuming the quantity of the perk that he would purchase at the outside
price po.5
Production technology and workers’ skills. Aw o r k e rn of preference type i, i = H,L,
generates a constant revenue yn
i for the ﬁrm. We wish to distinguish between jobs which are easy
to ﬁll and therefore the ﬁrm might ﬁnd it worthwhile to screen workers based on their preferences
4As we show elsewhere (Marino and Zabojnik, 2005), when the perk represents an employee discount on the ﬁrm’s
product, the ﬁrm’s optimal outside price depends upon the employee discount. However, we also show that if the
demand by the ﬁrm’s employees represents only a small fraction of the overall market for the ﬁrm’s product, the
optimal outside price can be safely treated as unaﬀected by considerations of employee discounts.
Also, note that when the ﬁrm sells the perk in the outside market, our assumption of exogenous outside price does
not mean that we assume that the ﬁrm does not choose its outside price so as to maximize proﬁt. We could always
specify an outside demand function such that p
o is the proﬁt maximizing price.
5Our model is thus in the class of problems with type dependent participation constraints. The countervailing
incentives model of Lewis and Sappington (1989) is a primary example of this type of model. See also the paper
by Jullien (2000) which examines optimal contracting by an uninformed principal when an informed agent has type
dependent reservation utility.
6for the perk, and jobs in which screening based on preferences would be too costly because there
are few suitable applicants and the position might end up vacant. We will call the former a low
skill job and the latter a high skill job.
Formally, the low skill job is not sensitive to workers’ skills and each worker n has the same
productivity y. In the high skill job, the workers’ productivities are sensitive to their skills. Specif-
ically, we assume that worker 1 is the most productive worker regardless of his tastes for the perk:
y1
i >y n
i ,f o re a c hn 6=1and i = H,L. An applicant’s reservation utility and his preferences for the
perk are his private information, but the ﬁrm can observe each worker’s skill level. To simplify the
selection process, we will assume that the workers’ productivities are such that a ﬁrm seeking to
ﬁll a high skill job ﬁnds it optimal to hire worker 1 regardless of his preference type. This will be
true if [y1
i − ¯ U1
i (po)] − [yn
j − ¯ Un
j (po)] is suﬃciently large for all n 6=1and for i,j = H,L.6
The in kind good. The perk may represent an amount of an endogenously discounted product
being produced by the ﬁrm or a purchased good. The ﬁrm can acquire (either purchase or produce)
the perk at a per unit cost c. We will not place any restrictions on the relationship between c and
the perk’s outside price po. The case where c<p o represents the case where the ﬁrm has a cost
advantage over the workers in procuring the perk (due to tax exemptions, economies of scale,
a complete absence of an outside market for the perk, and so on), as in the standard theories
mentioned in the Introduction. When c>p o, the outside market can supply the perk to the
workers at a lower cost than the ﬁrm, say, due to transaction costs that the ﬁrm has to incur in
obtaining the perk in the outside market and distributing it to the workers.
The contract. The ﬁrm faces a self selection problem where, in the absence of additional
constraints, it will have an incentive to oﬀer a menu of contracts (si,p i,q i). Here, si is the salary
6Even though in equilibrium one or the other of the preference types might not have a binding participation
constraint, this assumption is suﬃcient because y
n
i are exogenenous and independent of the cost minimization problem
we will analyze.
7received by a worker of type i if employed by the ﬁrm, pi is the price at which the ﬁrm sells the
in-kind good to the employee, and qi is the quantity of the perk the worker buys from the ﬁrm
at price pi. To ease our comparison of the proﬁt maximizing price with the price that maximizes
total surplus, we will let pi be independent of qi, so that we can compare numbers rather than
functions. This assumption also simpliﬁes parts of the analysis, without being overly restrictive: It
will become clear that in two out of the three contracts that we consider the assumption plays no
role, while in the third one (analyzed in Section 5) it merely constrains the eﬃciency of the optimal
contract, without much of an eﬀect on our qualitative results.
The worker can choose to purchase an additional amount, max{0,qo
i − qi},o ft h ei n - k i n dg o o d
in the outside market. The total utility that an agent of type i derives from working for the ﬁrm
is then si + ui(qmax
i ) − piqi − po
i(qo
i − qi),w h e r eqmax
i ≡ max{qo
i,q i}. To prevent wealth constraints
from aﬀecting the optimal contract, we assume that the agents are endowed with a suﬃciently large
ﬁxed income.
Finally, we assume that the perk provided by the ﬁrm cannot be resold by the worker to non-
employees of the ﬁrm. A large oﬃce is a good example of such a perk, secretarial support, services
and ﬂexible working hours are three additional examples. In cases where it is physically possible
for the employee to resell the perk, the ﬁrm could threaten sanctions, as many real world ﬁrms do,
such as dismissal if an employee is found to be arbitraging the perk. Such sanctions would not be
feasible for non-employees.
2.1. A benchmark case with perfect information
Consider a benchmark case of perfect information, in which the ﬁrm hires a worker with a known
demand for the perk, q(p),i m p l i c i t l yd e ﬁned by p = u0(q).T h eﬁrm solves max
{p,s}
[pq(p) − s − cq(p)]
subject to the worker’s participation constraint s + u(q) − p(q)q ≥ ¯ U(po), yielding the standard
8solution u0(q(p)) = c. It should also be clear that the ﬁrm provides the perk only if it can do so
more eﬃciently than the outside market, i.e. only if c ≤ po. The intuition is that, given that the
ﬁrm can take back consumer surplus through variations in the worker’s salary, the ﬁrm wants to
maximize total surplus in its pricing and allocation of the perk. This is analogous to a two part
tariﬀ with reduction of the salary as the entry fee.
The above solution obtains in our model when the ﬁrm seeks to ﬁll a low skill job. Since all the
workers in the labor pool are equally productive in this job, the ﬁrm simply designs a separating
contract so as to attract the preference type, i ∈ {L,H}, whose participation constraint is cheaper
to satisfy. Because the other type does not apply, the ﬁrm can oﬀer the full information eﬃcient
contract described above, with p = c. Thus, in the case of low skill jobs, we expect the standard
hedonic theory to apply.
In contrast, in a high skill job the workers’ skills are more important than their tastes and
the ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to hire worker 1 no matter whether he is of type H or L.T h u s ,a ﬁrm
seeking to ﬁll a high skill job is faced with a job candidate who has private information about his
preferences for the perk and about his outside opportunities. This setting will be our focus for the
rest of the paper.
3. The General Problem and the Set of Possible Contracts
In this section, we set up the ﬁrm’s general optimization problem when hiring for a high skill job and
characterize the set of possible contracts. For the sake of making our arguments more transparent,
we start by assuming that the in-kind good is not available on the outside market. After having
presented this clear cut case, we subsequently discuss the eﬀects of an outside market in each of
the three distinct settings that we will consider.
Because only the most skilled worker, worker 1, will be hired, we can simplify notation by
9suppressing the superscript n =1that denotes this worker. The ﬁrm’s general problem is then to
oﬀer worker 1 a menu of two contracts, (si,p i,Q i), i = H,L,w h e r esi ∈ R and pi ∈ R+, while Qi ∈ Q
is the set of qi ≥ 0 from which the worker is allowed to choose his preferred quantity of the perk.
The set Q that contains the feasible sets Qi is exogenously given. It measures the degree of control
the ﬁrm can exercise in a given speciﬁc situation over the quantities consumed by the workers,
and it could depend upon things such as the nature of the perk, the ﬁrm’s costs of monitoring the
workers’ consumption of the perk, and so on. Although this set could be quite general, we will
restrict our attention to two speciﬁc cases that we ﬁnd to be empirically most appealing. In the
ﬁrst case, the ﬁrm has no direct control over the quantities consumed by the workers and it can only
inﬂuence these quantities through the prices it sets for the perk. In this case, Qi = R+ and Q only
has one element: Q = {R+}. This case corresponds to complete decentralization of consumption,
where the worker is presented with the perk’s price and chooses any quantity he likes. The second
case of interest is where the ﬁrm has complete control over the quantities consumed by the workers.
In this case, Qi can be any subset of R+,s ot h a tQ = {S : S ⊂ R+}.T h i s s p e c i ﬁcation allows
the ﬁrm to oﬀer each worker a unique quantity he has to consume if he accepts the contract. This
would be a natural speciﬁcation of the ﬁrm’s problem when the perk is a public good or it needs
to be provided before the job is ﬁlled with a particular worker, say an oﬃce building.





πi (yi − si + piqi − cqi) (MAX)
subject to








,i = H,L, (UMi)








,i , j = H,L, (ICi)
si − piqi + ui(qi) ≥ ¯ si,i = H,L, (PCi)
10The "utility maximization" constraints (UMi) guarantee that the quantity qi maximizes worker i’s
utility given the perk’s price pi and given the worker’s choice set Qi.C o n s t r a i n t( I C i) is an incentive
compatibility constraint for type i, which ensures that a worker of this type does not choose the
contract designed for type j 6= i.F i n a l l y ,t h e( P C i) constraints ensure that both preference types
are willing to accept the employment oﬀer.
Depending upon the particular economic environment in which they operate, real world ﬁrms
may face additional constraints on their choice of the sextuple (si,p i,Q i), i = H,L. For example,
non-discrimination rules may discourage them from charging diﬀerent prices for the perk, which
would add an additional constraint, pH = pL = p.7 I nt h ec a s ew h e r et h eﬁrm can control quantities
(i.e., Q = {S : S ⊂ R+}), the ﬁrm may need to purchase the perk before ﬁlling the job with a
particular worker, which would add an extra constraint qH = qL = q. Finally, the ﬁrm may face
an institutional constraint, say due to equity considerations, that prevents it from oﬀering a menu
of salaries. This would be captured by a constraint sH = sL = s. Thus, ideally, we would like to
analyze the ﬁrm’s problem not only as stated in (MAX), but also subject to all possible variations
of additional constraints on si,q i and pi of the form
zH = zL = z,( 1 )
where zi = si,q i, or pi,f o ri = H,L.
For Q such that the ﬁrm cannot control the quantity of the perk consumed by the workers
(Q = {R+}), so that qi cannot be constrained by (1), there are three variations of the ﬁrm’s
problem with additional constraints on si and pi of the form (1), plus the basic problem in (MAX).
7Such non-discrimination rules are in fact embedded in the U.S. tax code. According to the general rules under
IRC Section 132, many beneﬁts (such as discounts) are tax free to employees only if they are nondiscriminatory.
Although technically these constraints may not apply if diﬀerential prices for the same beneﬁta r eo ﬀered to all
potential workers as a self selection contract, in practice, the ﬁrm might ﬁnd it hard to enforce higher perk prices for
workers who chose a higher salary contract.
11The second speciﬁcation, where the ﬁrm has control over the perk’s quantity (Q = {S : S ⊂ R+}),
admits a total of eight diﬀerent variations of the problem. The following lemma shows that, for each
Q, all of the possible variations can be mapped (in the sense that they yield the same equilibrium
outcomes) to two general formulations of the problem.
Lemma 1. Any formulation of the optimization problem (MAX) subject to additional constraints
on si,q i and pi of the form expressed in (1) is,
(i) for Q = {S : S ⊂ R+}, either equivalent to (a) a problem where the ﬁrm chooses (pi,s i,q i),
i = H,L, such that pi = p, si = s, and qi = q, i = L,H, or to (b) the general problem in
(MAX) without additional constraints (1);
(ii) for Q = {R+}, either equivalent to (c) the problem in (MAX) subject to additional constraints
pi = p and si = s, or to (d) the general problem in (MAX) without additional constraints (1).
L e m m a1s i m p l i ﬁe st h ea n a l y s i sb yn a r r o w i n gd o w nt h es e to ft h et w e l v ee c o n o m i ce n v i r o n m e n t s
that can be generated from (MAX) by including additional constraints of the form (1) to four basic
problems. In the ﬁrst one, the ﬁrm oﬀers the same contract, (s,q,p), to both types of workers, i.e.,
sH = sL = s, qH = qL = q,a n dpH = pL = p. The second problem allows the ﬁr m ,i fi tc h o o s e ss o ,
to give each worker an all or none choice of a speciﬁc quantity of the perk. In the third problem,
the ﬁrm oﬀers the same salaries and prices to all workers, but each worker buys any quantity he
likes. Finally, in the last setting the ﬁrm oﬀers a menu of salaries and prices, and lets each worker
buy any quantity he likes.
We ﬁrst analyze the simpler, and empirically appealing, uniform contracts (a) and (c). Sub-
sequently, we will provide a brief analysis of the menu of quantities contract (b). In order to
economize on space, we will omit the menu of prices case (d), which seems to us to be of limited
12practical interest.8
4. Case (a): The Firm Oﬀers a Uniform Quantity Contract to all Workers
We start with the uniform quantity problem identiﬁed in part (a) of Lemma 1, where the ﬁrm
devises a single contract oﬀered to all worker types, i.e., si = s, qi = q,a n dpi = p, i = L,H.N o t e
that this case is equivalent to cases where the ﬁrm is constrained to oﬀer qi and one of either si or
pi in a uniform manner. To see this suppose for example that si and pi can vary across the two
types of workers, but qi cannot, that is, it must be that q1 = q2 = q. Because the workers have
quasi-linear utility functions, both the ﬁrm and the workers care about si and pi only through the
transfer term ti = si −piqi. This problem is therefore equivalent to the one where the ﬁrm chooses
ti and q. However, if, say, t1 >t 2, then both types strictly prefer contract (t1,q) to contract (t2,q),
which means that no worker will ever select the latter contract. Therefore, this menu of contracts
is equivalent to oﬀering a single contract, (t1,q)=( t,q).M a k i n gq and either p or s uniform then
makes all three variables uniform. A real world application of this scenario is that the salary is
attached to a job position which the ﬁrm needs to ﬁll and the perk is provided as a public good
(si = s and qi = q). For example, all employees are located in a well designed and appointed oﬃce
building in a desirable location. This assumption is also realistic where the ﬁrm has to invest in
the perk (say, equip an oﬃce) before hiring a particular worker. Finally, in some situations, a ﬁrm
may choose to give away a particular quantity of the perk to all employees in a uniform way for
reasons that are outside of the model, such as simplicity, equity considerations, or impossibility to
restrict resale to other employees. For example, every employee of Starbucks Corporation gets a
free pound of coﬀee or box of tea each week (qi = q and pi = p =0 )(Baltimore Sun, 2004).
8The qualitative characteristics of the optimal contract in case (d) is similar to those obtained for the uniform
price contract (c). The only new insight in the menu of prices case is that the perk provision is somewhat more
eﬃcient, because the ﬁrm has more degrees of freedom in designing the contracts.
134.1. The optimal quantity in the uniform contract
We start by comparing the ﬁr m ’ so p t i m a la m o u n to ft h ep e r kw i t ht h ee ﬃcient amount under
the assumption that the perk is not available on the outside market, as this comparison allows us
to better highlight the intuition behind our results. Conditional on qH = qL,t h ee x - a n t ee ﬃcient
amount of the perk, qe, maximizes the expected total surplus,
PH
i=L πi(yi+ui(q))−cq. The amount





i be the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient quantity of the perk good such that9
u0
i(qe
i)=c, i = H,L.
From Assumption 1, it must be both that qe
H >q e
L and that the function ∆u(q),d e ﬁned by
∆u(q) ≡ uH(q) − uL(q), is strictly increasing in q. Also, in order to simplify the statement of our
subsequent results, denote as ∆¯ U(po) the diﬀerence between the two types’ reservation utilities,
i.e., ∆¯ U(po) ≡ ¯ UH(po)− ¯ UL(po) (which simpliﬁes to ∆¯ U(po)=¯ sH −¯ sL in the absence of an outside
market). Finally, let ˆ q be implicitly deﬁned by
∆u(ˆ q)=∆¯ U(po). (3)
The economic meaning of quantity ˆ q is that it is the quantity at which both participation constraints
are binding. Note that, generically, ˆ q 6= qe.
9I ft h eg o o dw e r ea v a i l a b l ei nt h eo u t s i d em a r k e ta tap r i c ep

















14N o w ,t h ef a c tt h a tt h eﬁrm can control the quantity of the perk consumed by the workers makes
the optimal price indeterminate. Thus, in this scenario, the linear pricing assumption imposes no
restriction; in fact, we can without loss of generality set p =0 . Since both the (UMi)a n dt h e( I C i)
constraints are trivially satisﬁed in the present setting (the former because the worker’s choice set
contains a single element, qi; the latter because the ﬁrm only oﬀers a single contract), the ﬁrm’s
optimization problem reduces to choosing the quantity of the perk, q∗,a n dt h es a l a r y ,s∗,t h a t
minimize its cost, s + cq, subject to
s + ui(q) ≥ ¯ Ui(po)=¯ si,i = H,L. (PC’
i)
The solution to the above problem and its allocational eﬃciency can be described as follows.
Proposition 1. Suppose the perk is not available on the outside market. When limq→∞ ∆u(q) >
∆¯ U(po) > 0, there exist c∗∗ >c ∗ > 0 such that the allocational eﬃciency of the contract is
characterized by (i)-(iii) below.
(i) If c ≤ c∗,t h e nq∗ = qe
L <q e.
(ii) If c ≥ c∗∗,t h e nq∗ = qe
H >q e.
(iii) If c ∈ (c∗,c ∗∗),t h e nq∗ =ˆ q ∈ (qe
L,qe
H).
When ∆¯ U(po) ≤ 0, then (i) holds for all c. When limq→∞ ∆u(q) ≤ ∆¯ U(po), then (ii) holds for
all c.
Proposition 1 tells us that the ﬁrm typically issues the perk in a socially ineﬃcient way. For some
parameter values, the amount of the perk issued by the ﬁrm is too large, while for other parameter
values it is too low. Speciﬁcally, when the perk’s marginal cost is low, then both workers optimally
consume relatively large quantities of it, so that a type H worker values the perk substantially
15more than a type L worker. If at the same time the diﬀerence between the two types’ reservation
utilities is relatively small or possibly negative, then the ﬁrm needs to worry more about satisfying
type L’s than type H’s participation constraint.10 In this case, the employment contract is tailored
to suit type L workers, oﬀering their surplus maximizing quantity of the perk, qe
L.B e c a u s e qe
L
is lower than the ex-ante eﬃcient level qe (which lies between qe
L and qe
H), in this case the ﬁrm
under-supplies the perk. An alternative view of this process is that the ﬁrm bundles the in-kind
good with the worker’s monetary compensation in order to better extract the worker’s surplus. In
particular, worker H’s valuation of the perk is so high in this case, that this worker receives an
information rent, equal to [¯ UL(po)−uL(q∗)]−[¯ UH(po)−uH(q∗)] = ∆u(q∗)−∆¯ U(po) > 0. Because
this information rent increases in q∗,t h eﬁrm minimizes it by under-supplying the perk.
On the other hand, if the reservation utility of type H worker is considerably higher than that
of type L, while their valuations of the perk do not diﬀer very much (which tends to be the case
when c is large so that the optimal consumption levels are low), then attracting worker H is more
diﬃcult than attracting worker L. In this case, the contract is optimally designed to suit worker
H,o ﬀering the quantity of the perk, qe
H, that maximizes this worker’s surplus. Because qe
H >q e,
in this case the ﬁrm supplies a greater than constrained-eﬃcient quantity of the perk. Using again
the surplus-extraction intuition, when the workers’ reservation utilities and valuations for the perk
are correlated but worker H’s valuation of the perk is not too high, then worker L receives an
information rent, equal to [¯ UH(po)−uH(q∗)]−[¯ UL(po)−uL(q∗)] = ∆¯ U(po)−∆u(q∗) > 0. Because
this information rent decreases in q∗,t h eﬁrm has an incentive to over-supply the perk, which is
described by part (ii) in the proposition.
Finally, in the intermediate case where satisfying one type’s participation constraint does not
10Negative correlation is possible between preference for the perk and the reservation utility when the worker with
higher valuation has lower costs of production eﬀort. A person who enjoys contact with people may place a higher
v a l u eo nad e s i r a b l ed o w n t o w nl o c a t i o nw h i l ea tt h es a m et i m eh a v eal o wc o s to fd o i n gh e rj o bw h i c hr e q u i r e sp e o p l e
skills.
16automatically imply that the other type’s participation constraint is satisﬁed, the quantity of the
perk is intermediate, between qe
L and qe
H. However, constrained eﬃciency can only be obtained
in the knife-edge case in which the workers’ valuations and reservation utilities happen to be such
that neither of them receives an information rent, that is, ∆¯ U(po) − ∆u(qe)=0 .
4.2. The eﬀects of an outside market
The outside market aﬀects the ﬁrm’s optimization problem in two ways. First, the ﬁrm faces an
additional constraint, p∗ ≤ po,r e ﬂecting the fact that it has to oﬀer the perk at a price which is
no greater than its outside price. Since we can always set p∗ =0 , this constraint can be ignored
here. The second eﬀect of the outside market is through the workers’ participation constraints. If
hired, the worker consumes at least the amount of the perk that he receives from the ﬁrm, q, but
possibly more, if he chooses to purchase an additional amount, qo
i −q, in the outside market. Thus,
recalling the notation qmax
i ≡ max{qo
i,q}, the participation constraints are now written as
Ui(s,q,po) ≥ ¯ Ui(po). (PCi”)
Here, ¯ Ui(po)=¯ si + ui(qo
i) − poqo
i, i = L,H,11 and
Ui(s,q,po)=s + ui(qmax
i ) − po(qmax
i − q) ≥ ¯ si + ui(qo
i) − poqo
i
is worker i’s utility if hired by the ﬁrm.
The eﬀect of the outside market on the ﬁrm’s decision whether to supply the perk and on the
optimal quantity of the perk is characterized in the following proposition.
11To reduce the number of cases that need to be considered, we are assuming that p
o is suﬃciently low so that
both types buy the perk on the outside market if not employed by the ﬁrm.
17Proposition 2.
(i) If the ﬁrm is constrained to oﬀer a uniform quantity contract, it will provide the perk if and
only if c ≤ po.
(ii) Holding c constant, q∗ weakly decreases in po.F o rc ∈ (c∗,c ∗∗), q∗ strictly decreases in po.
(iii) If ∆¯ U(po) ≤ 0 and c ≤ po,t h e ni ne q u i l i b r i u mt h et y p eH worker receives the perk from the
ﬁrm but also buys an additional amount on the outside market.
An interesting aspect of the comparative static result of part (ii) in Proposition 2 is that the
quantity of the perk that the ﬁrm provides declines with the outside price even if the marginal cost
to the ﬁrm of procuring the perk remains ﬁxed. The economic reasoning is that the higher is the
outside price, the more additional utility the workers get from an extra unit of the perk. Hence, all
else equal, a smaller quantity of the perk is needed to satisfy the workers’ participation constraints.
4.3. Discussion and implications
Propositions 1 and 2 suggest several implications that distinguish our model from existing theories
of employee beneﬁts.
First, an intriguing implication of Proposition 1 (which will be conﬁrmed in the two settings
considered subsequently) is that it oﬀers an alternative view of the motives that lead some ﬁrms to
provide excessive perks to their executives. In both the academic literature and the popular press,
executive perks, such as plush oﬃces, lavish retirement packages, corporate jets, and so on, are
frequently considered to be excessive compared to the ﬁrms’ proﬁt-maximizing levels. Following
Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) seminal paper, the academic literature views the excessive level of
managerial perks as a demonstration of agency problems that accompany the separation of own-
ership and control. While we certainly believe that in some cases managers misuse their positions
18to extract lavish perks, our model oﬀers an alternative interpretation of the problem. Part (ii)
in Proposition 1 implies that it may in fact be in a ﬁrm’s best interest to provide a greater than
the eﬃcient amount of managerial perks. Thus, in our framework, excessive provision of perks is
a deliberate proﬁt-maximizing strategy designed by the ﬁrm to minimize the cost of attracting a
manager. This meshes well with a recent study by Rajan and Wulf (2006), who test the empirical
implications of existing theories of managerial perks and conclude that agency theory alone cannot
explain the observed patterns in perk consumption by companies’ executive oﬃcers. Moreover,
our model oﬀers a potentially testable implication that distinguishes our theory from the standard
agency theory: The perks that are apparently over-supplied should have relatively higher marginal
costs than those that seem to be provided at eﬃcient (or lower than eﬃcient) levels.
Second, part (ii) in Proposition 2 implies that, controlling for the perk’s marginal cost, we
should observe the amount of the perk to be negatively correlated with the perk’s cost in the
outside market. For example, we would expect the ﬁrm to provide the perk in a smaller amount
when the perk is available on the outside market than when it is not.
The last prediction of the uniform quantity model follows from part (iii) in Proposition 2. This
result says that it should not be surprising for workers to buy quantities of a perk good provided by
their employer on the outside market. For example, free tuition for university employees and their
relatives rarely covers both college and graduate studies. The employees and their relatives who
pursue both an undergraduate and a graduate degree purchase one or the other from the outside
market. This prediction is not readily generated by the standard cost advantage theory.
5. Case (c): The Firm Oﬀers a Contract with a Uniform Price to all Workers
We now consider the setting where the workers are oﬀered the same price for the perk, but they can
buy as much of the perk as they wish. The proof of Lemma 1 implies that this case is equivalent
19to one in which the ﬁrm oﬀers a uniform salary and pricing of the perk to all job candidates. The
uniform price contract is very common in real world situations.





πi[yi − s + pqi(p) − cqi(p)]
subject to
u0
i(qi(p)) = p, i = H,L, (UMi)
Ui(p,s) ≥ ¯ Ui(po), (PCi)
p∗ ≤ po, (OM)
where Ui(p,s) ≡ s − pqi(p)+ui(qi(p)) is worker i’s utility from accepting a contract (p,s).
As before, we ﬁrst characterize the optimal contract under the assumption that the perk is not
available in the outside market. Thus, for now, ¯ Ui(po) ≡ ¯ si and we don’t have to worry about the





πi[yi + ui(qi(p)) − cqi(p)],
from which, using p = u0
i(q),t h ee ﬃcient price is pe = c. This price induces the ﬁrst-best quantities
qe
i,i= H,L, which represent the appropriate benchmark in this case.
Let ∆U(p) ≡ UH(p,s) − UL(p,s).W eh a v e :
Proposition 3. Suppose the ﬁrm oﬀers a uniform price contract, where each worker can choose
his preferred quantity of the perk. Suppose also the perk is not available on the outside market.
When limc→0 ∆U(p = c) > ∆¯ U(po), there exists a c+ ∈ [0,∞),w i t hc+ > 0 if ∆¯ U(po) > 0,
20such that the ﬁrm’s optimal pricing and allocation of the perk are given by (i)-(iii) below:
(i) If c<c +,t h e np∗ >p e = c and q∗
i <q e
i, i = H,L, that is, the price is above marginal cost
and the ﬁrm under-supplies the perk.
(ii) If c>c +,t h e np∗ <p e = c and q∗
i >q e
i, i = H,L, that is, the price is below marginal cost
and the ﬁrm over-supplies the perk.






If limc→0 ∆U(p = c) ≤ ∆¯ U(po),t h e nc+ =0 , so that part (ii) above applies for all c>0.
The results of Proposition 3 have the same ﬂavor, and are driven by similar economic forces,
as the standard results on two-part tariﬀ pricing by a monopolist facing heterogeneous consumers.
The optimal two-part tariﬀ for heterogeneous consumers sets the per unit price of the good above
its marginal cost, which allows the monopolist to better extract consumer surplus from the high
demand consumers. This is exactly what drives our result in part (i) of the proposition. When
the perk’s marginal cost is low, so that at the eﬃcient price the workers purchase relatively high
quantities of the good, the contract gives much more utility to the high valuation type H than
to the low valuation type L. Thus, if their reservation utilities do not diﬀer that much, so that
∆U(pe) > ∆¯ U(po), the high type receives an information rent if the perk is oﬀered at the eﬃcient
price equal to its marginal cost. By increasing the price, the ﬁrm can extract part of this surplus
through the proﬁt it makes on the relatively large quantity purchased by the high valuation worker.
The converse logic applies if the high valuation type’s utility from the eﬃcient quantity is not
suﬃciently high to compensate the worker for his reservation utility, i.e., if ∆U(pe) < ∆¯ U(po).
This case applies when c is large, because then the eﬃcient quantities for both workers are small,
and so is the extra surplus the high type derives from eﬃcient perk consumption. In this case,
21the ﬁrm needs to increase the high type’s utility. The cheapest way of doing so is through slightly
decreasing both the price of the perk and the salaries. Since the high type values the perk more
than the low type, while both value money equally, this adjustment in the contract gives relatively
more utility to the high type, thus decreasing the information rent obtained by the low type.
5.1. The eﬀects of an outside market
In the present setting, the outside market constraint aﬀects the optimal contract in two ways: (i)
through the workers’ reservation utilities and (ii) through the outside market constraint p ≤ po.
Denote the optimal price in this case as p∗∗.
Proposition 4. If the ﬁrm oﬀers a uniform price contract, the eﬀects of the outside market are
characterized as follows:
(a) The cutoﬀ level c+ increases in the outside price po, i.e. the lower is po, the more likely it is
that p∗ <c .
(b) For a given c, there exists a ˆ po(c) such that the perk is provided if and only if po ≥ ˆ po(c). If
c>c +, then ˆ po(c)=p∗ <c ;i f c ≤ c+,t h e nˆ po(c)=c.
(c) If po <p ∗ and the perk is provided, then p∗∗ = po and hence decreases in po.
(d) If po ≥ p∗,t h e np∗∗ = p∗ and p∗∗ is not aﬀected by the outside market.
Part (b) in Proposition 4 is one of our key results; it demonstrates that ﬁrms may have an
incentive to provide perks even if their cost of doing so is strictly higher than the price at which
the workers could obtain the perk in the outside market. This result is driven by the fact that
bundling cash and non-cash compensation allows a ﬁrm to save on its total wage bill by decreasing
the workers’ information rents, and this wage bill saving may be high enough to oﬀset the ﬁrm’s
relatively high cost of providing the perk.
225.2. Discussion and implications
Proposition 3 shows that when workers have control over the quantities of the perk they consume,
the ﬁrm will tend to deviate to a price below marginal cost for high marginal cost perks and to a
price above marginal cost for low marginal cost perks. This result, together with Proposition 4,
suggests three potentially testable implications that are novel to our theory:
The ﬁrst implication is that, in accord with the analysis of the previous case of uniform quan-
tities, below marginal cost pricing and excessive managerial perks should be more likely observed
when the perk’s marginal cost is relatively high than when its marginal cost is relatively low.
Second, part (a) in Proposition 4 says that the larger is the ﬁrm’s cost advantage in providing
the perk, the more likely is the ﬁrm to provide the perk to its employees at an above marginal cost
price. Conversely, the smaller is the ﬁrm’s cost advantage, the more likely is the ﬁrm to provide the
perk at a price below the perk’s marginal cost. Thus, a study that would ﬁnd a positive relationship
between p∗∗ and po, while controlling for the ﬁrm’s marginal cost c, would support our theory.
Finally, we have argued earlier that we view our theory as applying primarily to perks oﬀered
to workers in high skill jobs. As mentioned in the Introduction, this ﬁts well with the popular
belief, voiced in the business press, that ﬁrms provide perks to attract high quality workers. An
implication of this view is that deviations from marginal cost pricing should be more likely for
perks oﬀered to high skill employees than for perks oﬀered to low skill employees. Moreover, the
latter should be less likely oﬀered the perk in the ﬁrst place. For example, lower level employees
should in general get diﬀerent employee discounts and diﬀerently priced company loans and pension
plans than senior managers. This is because the relative abundance of low skill workers, combined
with the low sensitivity of these workers’ productivities to their skill levels, allows a ﬁrm to ﬁnd
workers with relatively homogeneous preferences for the perk. In such a case, we would expect
the standard theory to apply, and the perks to be oﬀered to low skilled workers at marginal cost
23(or not at all, if the ﬁrm has no cost advantage in providing the perk). In contrast, if high skill
workers (say, senior managers) are in relatively short supply, it could be costly for a ﬁrm to screen
these workers according to their preferences for perks.12 It is therefore likely that ﬁrms end up
with senior managers who diﬀer in their valuations for the perk. In this case, our theory says that
deviation from marginal cost pricing may be optimal, as may be providing the perk even in the
absence of a cost advantage.
Extending the above argument, our model can also shed some light on the "good jobs/bad
jobs" debate. Many researchers have observed that the economy seems to consist of two types of
jobs, "good" and "bad", where the good jobs, ﬁlled typically with high skilled workers, oﬀer both
higher monetary compensation and more beneﬁts (see, e.g. Doeringer and Piore, 1971, for an early
formulation of this view). Previous theoretical explanations oﬀered for this phenomenon have built
either upon the eﬃciency wage theory (Bulow and Summers, 1986) or on the search theory (e.g.,
Acemoglu, 2001). Our theory oﬀers an alternative explanation: The high skill jobs in our model
are also good jobs in the above sense; they not only oﬀer high wages (reﬂecting high worker skills),
but also generous beneﬁts, because ﬁrms attach to these jobs even some perks that would not be
oﬀered under full information. In contrast, low skill jobs are bad jobs, because, in addition to low
wages, they oﬀer relatively few beneﬁts–only those beneﬁts are oﬀered for which the ﬁrm has a
cost advantage over the outside market.
6. Case (b): The Firm Can Oﬀer a Menu of Quantities
In this section, we brieﬂy examine case (b) in Lemma 1, where the ﬁrm can oﬀer a full menu
of contracts. This last scenario is captured by the optimization problem given by (MAX) under
the assumption that the ﬁrm has full control over the quantities consumed by the workers, with
12For example, it could make sense for an airline company to select its ﬂight attendants based on whether they like
to travel, but it would be less sensible to put much weight on this criterion if the same company were hiring a CEO.
24no additional constraints of the form described by (1). That is, the ﬁrm can design a diﬀerent
compensation package (si,q i,p i) for each type of worker. The contract that solves this problem
places an upper bound on how well the ﬁrm can do when faced with asymmetric information
about the worker’s type. Examples of this type of contract include cases where the ﬁrm oﬀers
employees the option of, say, less salary and more of a beneﬁt, or conversely. Contract workers, for
example, trade oﬀ beneﬁts for a higher salary. Professional workers wanting more ﬂexible hours
and infrequent travel might self select into a contract in which salary is less as opposed to a career
type contract where inﬂexible hours and frequent travel are requirements.13
We again start by describing the ﬁrm’s optimal contract when the perk is not available in the
outside market. Denote the ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximizing values as q∗
i , p∗
i and s∗
i. As in the case of the
uniform quantity contract, the optimal prices p∗
i are indeterminate here. The following proposition
is driven by similar economic forces as Proposition 3.
Proposition 5. Suppose that the ﬁrm can oﬀer a menu of quantity contracts (si,q i,p i) and the




L.M o r es p e c i ﬁcally,
when limq→∞ ∆u(q) > ∆¯ U(po) > 0,t h e r ee x i s tc00 >c 0 > 0 such that:










(iii) If c ∈ [c0,c 00],t h e nq∗
i = qe
i,i= H,L.
When ∆¯ U(po) ≤ 0, then (i) holds for all c. When limq→∞ ∆u(q) < ∆¯ U(po), then (ii) holds for
all c.
As in the two uniform contract scenarios, bundling cash and in-kind compensation allows the
ﬁrm to increase its proﬁts by extracting information rents from its workers. Not surprisingly, the
13An example is a "mommy track" position at a professional ﬁrm. Here the term mommy is gender neutral.
25ﬁrm can do this more eﬀectively if it faces fewer restrictions on the set of contracts it can oﬀer.
Proposition 5 conﬁrms this intuition by showing that the ability to oﬀer a menu of contracts allows
the ﬁrm to supply the perk in an eﬃcient manner for a range of parameter values, which was not
optimal in the previous two scenarios. Nevertheless, the qualitative results obtained in Propositions
1 and 3 continue to hold in the present setting, as there are still parameter values such that the
perk is under-supplied or over-supplied.
Thus, the main new prediction that emerges in the present setting is that the ﬁrm will tend to
design its menu of contracts so as to induce high valuation workers to self select into a contract that
tends to over-supply the perk or to induce low valuation workers to self-select into a contract that
tends to under-supply the perk. For example, in ﬁrms that allow their employees to choose more
ﬂexible hours in exchange for lower salary, we would expect the ﬂexible position to oﬀer too much
ﬂexibility (compared to the eﬃcient level) or the regular position to allow for too little ﬂexibility.
6.1. The eﬀects of an outside market
When the ﬁrm oﬀers a menu of contracts, the eﬀects of the outside market are described in the
following proposition.
Proposition 6.
(a) If the ﬁrm oﬀers a menu of quantity and salary contracts, the cutoﬀ levels c0 and c00 both
increase in the outside price po. That is, a higher po makes it more likely that the ﬁrm
under-supplies the perk to the L-type worker and less likely that it over-supplies the perk to
the H-type worker.
(b) If c>c +, there exists a ˜ po(c) <csuch that the perk is provided to at least one type of worker
for all po ≥ ˜ po(c).
26The above results conﬁrm the main insights of Proposition 4. As before, the smaller is the
ﬁrm’s cost advantage in providing the perk, the more likely it will over-supply it. Moreover, under
some parameter values the perk is provided to at least one type of worker where it would be more
socially eﬃcient not to provide it at all.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued that the standard conclusion that a ﬁrm should price a perk at its
marginal cost, which appears to be violated in many real world situations, does not apply to a ﬁrm
that hires workers with private information regarding their heterogenous preferences for the perk
and their heterogenous outside opportunities. We have developed a theory of perks in which the
ﬁrm bundles perks with cash compensation in order to extract information rents from workers with
private information. This allows the ﬁrm to attract workers at a lower cost. The novel implication
of our theory is that the ﬁrm might ﬁnd it optimal to provide a perk even if it cannot do so more
eﬀectively than the outside market. This never happens when the ﬁrm is constrained to oﬀer a
uniform quantity contract, but is a distinct possibility both in the case of a menu of quantity
contracts and in the case of a uniform price contract.
In addition, our model oﬀers potentially testable implications regarding the prices at which ﬁrms
will oﬀer the perk to their employees and regarding the quantities of the perk they will provide. In
particular, we show that the ﬁrm will tend to over-supply the perk when the perk has a relatively
high marginal cost and to under supply it when it has a relatively low marginal cost. Moreover,
if the ﬁrm is oﬀering a bundle with a uniform price for the perk across workers, it will set the
uniform price below the marginal cost price if marginal cost of the perk is high and conversely if
the marginal cost is low (unless constrained by the price of the perk in the outside market).
Finally, we have argued that our theory should apply especially to perks associated with high
27skill jobs (e.g., senior managers): When a job requires no special skills, the ﬁrm might ﬁnd it
optimal to select its workers based on their preferences for the beneﬁts it oﬀers. On the other
hand, if the required skills are relatively rare, the ﬁrm will probably hire the suitable candidate
regardless of his preference for the perk. Low skill positions will then tend to be ﬁlled with workers
of homogeneous tastes for the ﬁrm’s perk, while high skill positions will likely be populated by
workers with heterogenous preferences for the perk, as in our model. Our theory then predicts
that high skill jobs should be "good jobs", oﬀering not only higher wages but also more beneﬁts,
because the ﬁrms might ﬁnd it optimal to provide even beneﬁts that would be more eﬃcient for the
workers to obtain from the outside market. Since such beneﬁts are not valuable to the ﬁrms when
they do not have to worry about skills and can select employees based on their tastes for beneﬁts,
low skill positions should be associated not only with lower wages but also with fewer beneﬁts.
Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :(i) Suppose that Q = {S : S ⊂ R+}.W eﬁrst show that the ﬁrm will ﬁnd it
optimal to limit Qi t oas i n g l eq u a n t i t y ,qi,i . e .Qi = {qi}. Assume to the contrary that Qi contains
at least two elements, q1 6= q2. Suppose further, without loss of generality, that q1 solves the ﬁrm’s
optimization problem. Then eliminating q2 from Qi does not aﬀect the workers’ (PCi)c o n s t r a i n t s
and makes it easier to satisfy for q1 the (UMi)a n d( I C i) constraints. Consequently, the ﬁrm must
be at least weakly better oﬀ if q2 is eliminated from Qi.
Given that Qi = {qi} in this case, prices are irrelevant (as the ﬁrm can force the worker
to consume qi if he accepts the contract) and we can set pi =0 , i = L,H, so that the ﬁrm only
optimizes over (si,q i). We thus need to consider four cases: (1) si and qi are subject to no additional
constraints, (2) si are unconstrained but qH = qL = q,( 3 )qi are unconstrained but sH = sL = s,
and (4) qH = qL = q and sH = sL = s.
28Case (1) is equivalent to the problem in (MAX). Cases (2) and (3), on the other hand, are both
equivalent to case (4). To see this, look at case (2) ﬁrst and suppose that si >s j, i 6= j.I nt h i s
case, the contract (si,q) is strictly preferred by both types to the contract (sj,q). Therefore, it is
n o tp o s s i b l et os a t i s f yt h et w oi n c e n t i v ec o m p a t i b i l i t yc o n s t r a i n t s( I C H)a n d( I C L) simultaneously.
Hence, it must be si = sj, which makes the ﬁr m ’ sp r o b l e me q u i v a l e n tt ot h a ti nc a s e( i v ) . T h e
reasoning for the equivalence between cases (3) and (4) is analogous. This proves that the only
two relevant cases to consider are case (1), which is equivalent to (MAX) and yields part (a) in the
lemma, and case (4), which yields part (b).
(ii) When Q = {R+} then also Qi = Qj = {R+},i . e . ,t h eﬁr mc a no n l ya ﬀect qi through
the prices pL and pH, which uniquely determine the quantities through the workers’ demands,
u0
i(qi(p)) = p. Thus, in this case the ﬁrm optimizes over (si,p i) and we again need to consider
four cases: (1) si and pi are subject to no additional constraints, (2) si are unconstrained but
pH = pL = p,( 3 )pi are unconstrained but sH = sL = s,a n d( 4 )pH = pL = p and sH = sL = s.
T h es a m el o g i ca si np a r t( i )( w i t hqi being replaced by pi) shows that (2) and (3) are equivalent
to (4), so that the only two relevant cases to consider are case (1), which is equivalent to (MAX)
and yields part (c) in the lemma, and case (4), which yields part (d). ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :Because the ﬁrm can control the quantity, q, we can, without loss of
generality, set p =0in solving for the optimal contract, as we have already mentioned in the text.
To see this, suppose that a contract (s,q,p) is optimal, where p>0. This contract gives the worker
utility equal to s − pq + ui(q). But this is equivalent to a contract (s0,q,p 0),w h e r ep0 =0and
s0 = s − pq.
We ﬁrst prove the following claim:
(i) If ∆¯ U(po) ≤ ∆u(qe
L), then q∗ = qe
L <q e.
29(ii) If ∆¯ U(po) ≥ ∆u(qe
H), then q∗ = qe
H >q e.
(iii) If ∆¯ U(po) ∈ (∆u(qe
L),∆u(qe
H)),t h e nq∗ =ˆ q ∈ (qe
L,qe
H).
Let λi be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the participation constraint (PCi). The ﬁrm’s
problem is then given by the Lagrangian
max
{s,q}
−s − cq +
L X
i=H
λi(s + ui(q) − ¯ Ui(po)),
which yields the ﬁrst order conditions:




Suppose ﬁrst that λH =0and λL > 0. Then (a.1) and (a.2) imply λL =1and u0
L(q∗)=c, so
that q∗ = qe
L.T h i si st h es o l u t i o nt ot h eﬁrm’s problem if it also satisﬁes the two (PCi)c o n s t r a i n t s .
Since λL > 0, s must be chosen such that (PCL) binds when q = qe
L.( P C H) then holds if and only
if ∆u(qe
L) ≥ ∆¯ U(po), which is the condition in part (i) of the proposition. To conclude the proof
of this part, note that qe
L <q e because u0
L(q) <π Hu0
H(q)+πLu0
L(q) for any q>0 and πH > 0.
Next suppose that λH > 0 and λL =0 . Then (1) and (2) imply λH =1and u0
H(q∗)=c, so that
q∗ = qe
H.S i n c eλH > 0, s must be chosen such that (PCH) holds with equality when q = qe
H.( P C L)
then holds if and only if ∆u(qe
H) ≤ ∆¯ U(po), which is the condition in part (ii) of the proposition.
Also, qe
H >q e because u0
H(q) >π Hu0
H(q)+πLu0
L(q) for any q>0 and πH < 1.
Finally, if ∆u(qe
H) > ∆¯ U(po) > ∆u(qe
L), then neither of the above two cases applies, so that it
must be λH > 0 and λL > 0.T h e r e f o r e ,b o t h ( P C i) constraints must be binding, which implies





L(q) for any q>0. This means that ˆ q ∈ (qe
H,qe
L).
30Now, to translate the above claim into the claims in the proposition, note that ∆¯ U(po) is
unaﬀected by c,b u t∆u(qe
L) decreases in c (because qe
L goes down), with limc→∞ ∆u(qe
L)=0 .
Hence, for any ∆¯ U(po) > 0 there must exist c∗,c ∗∗ ∈ [0,∞), c∗∗ >c ∗, such that ∆u(qe
L) ≥ ∆¯ U(po)
iﬀ c ≤ c∗ and ∆u(qe
H) ≤ ∆¯ U(po) iﬀ c ≥ c∗∗. This proves (i)-(iii) in the proposition. If ∆¯ U(po) ≤ 0
then it must always be ∆¯ U(po) ≤ ∆u(qe
L), so that (i) in the proposition applies for all c. Finally,
when limq→∞ ∆u(q) ≤ ∆¯ U(po) then ∆¯ U(po) ≥ ∆u(qe
H) always, which proves the last claim in the
proposition. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :Instead of using the Lagrangian method to characterize the ﬁrm’s
optimal solution as in the proof of Proposition 1, we oﬀer here a proof that is less formal but
more intuitive. Analogous to (3), deﬁne ˆ q(po) as the quantity such that ∆U(ˆ q)=∆¯ U, where
∆U(q) ≡ UH(s, ˆ q,po) − UL(s, ˆ q,po) and ∆¯ U(po) ≡ ¯ UH(¯ sH,p o) − ¯ UL(¯ sL,p o).
The ﬁrm’s problem is to satisfy the both workers’ participation constraints (PCi”) at the lowest
possible cost. If a worker i’s participation constraint does not hold, the ﬁrm can increase his utility
Ui(s,q,po) in two ways. The ﬁr s ti st oi n c r e a s et h ew o r k e r s ’s a l a r i e s ,s, which increases their utility
dollar by dollar. The second possibility is to increase the quantity of the perk. This costs the ﬁrm
c per unit and increases the worker’s utility by
∂Ui(s,q,po)
∂q
= po if q<q o







i(q) if q ≥ qo
i,i . e .qmax
i = q.
Thus, if q<q o
i and po ≥ c,t h eﬁrm will ﬁnd it optimal to increase the amount of the perk rather
than increasing salaries. If q<q o
i and po <c , then the ﬁrm wants to decrease q and increase
salaries instead. This implies that q∗ ≥ qo
i if po ≥ c and q∗ =0or q∗ ≥ qo
i if po <c .
31Thus, suppose q ≥ qo
i. Then the ﬁrm increases the amount of the perk instead of increasing
salaries iﬀ u0
i(q) ≥ c. Suppose ﬁrst that po <c .S i n c e q ≥ qo
i,i tm u s tb et h a tu0
i(q) ≤ po <c .
Hence, the ﬁrm wants to decrease q in this case and we can conclude that q∗ =0if po <c .
If po ≥ c, then the fact that ﬁrm increases the amount of the perk if u0
i(q) ≥ c means that
q∗ ≥ qe
L, because qe




H. If both participation constraints are
satisﬁed at q = qe
L,t h eﬁrm stops there and q∗ = qe
L. On the other hand, if type H’s participation
constraint does not hold at q = qe
L,t h eﬁrm will ﬁnd it optimal to give this worker additional
utility by increasing q further, because u0
H(qe
L) >c .T h eﬁrm will stop increasing q when u0
H(q) ≥ c
stops holding, i.e. when q = qe
H,o rw h e nq =ˆ q (in which case both participation constraints are
satisﬁed), whichever comes ﬁrst.
To sum up, when c ≤ po we have the following result, which extends Proposition 1 to the present
setting:
(i) q∗ = qe
L if both participation constraints hold at q = qe
L when s is such that (PCL) binds, i.e.,
if ∆U(qe
L) − ∆¯ U(po) ≥ 0.
(ii) q∗ = qe
H if type H’s participation constraint does not hold at q = qe
L when s is such that
(PCL) binds, i.e. if ∆U(qe
H) − ∆¯ U(po) ≤ 0.
(iii) q∗ =ˆ q ∈ (qe
L,qe
H),o t h e r w i s e ,i . e .i f∆¯ U(po) ∈ (∆U(qe
L),∆U(qe
H)).
We can now characterize the eﬀect of po on q∗. For this, we need to determine how po aﬀects
ˆ q(po) and the conditions ∆U(qe
L) − ∆¯ U(po) ≥ 0 and ∆U(qe
H) − ∆¯ U(po) ≤ 0.
We start with the two conditions. Deﬁne A(q) ≡ ∆U(q)−∆¯ U(po), and note that po ≥ c implies
that q∗ ≥ qe
L ≥ qo
L,s ot h a tqmax
L = q always. Thus,
A(q)=uH(qmax
H ) − uL(q) − po(qmax





32When q = qe
L, we have to consider two cases. In the ﬁrst, qe
L ≤ qo
H,s ot h a tqmax
H = qo







L) − (¯ sH − ¯ sL).













In the second case, qe
L >q o





































L) always increases as po goes up, which means that the condition ∆U(qe
L)−∆¯ U(po) ≥ 0
is more likely to hold. Thus, q∗ is more likely to be at its minimum level q∗ = qe
L,w h i c hm e a n s
that an increase in po tends to weakly decrease q∗ in this case.
Next, let q = qe
H.S i n c epo ≥ c,i tm u s tb eqe
H ≥ qo


















33Hence, an increase in po makes the condition ∆U(qe
H)−∆¯ U(po) ≤ 0 less likely to hold, which again
weakly decreases q∗.




H =ˆ q. It is straightforward to check that in both cases
∂A(ˆ q)
∂po > 0 and
∂A(ˆ q)
∂ˆ q > 0. Thus, it must be that ˆ q strictly decreases in po,w h i c hm a k e sq∗ strictly decreasing in
po for this range of parameter values. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :Note ﬁrst that if ∆U(p) > ∆¯ U(po) for a given p,t h e n( P C L)i m p l i e s
(PCH)a n d( P C H) is slack. Similarly, if the reverse inequality holds, then (PCH)i m p l i e s( P C L)
and (PCL) is slack. Note also that ∆U(p) ≥ 0 and
∂∆U(p)
∂p < 0, where the latter inequality holds
because u0
H >u 0
L.M o r e o v e r ,w eh a v e
∂∆U(p=c)
∂c < 0.
Suppose that limc→0 ∆U(p = c) > ∆¯ U(po). Then one can deﬁne implicitly a c+ ∈ (0,∞) by
∆U(p = c+)=∆¯ U(po). Assume ﬁrst that c<c +,s ot h a t∆U(p = c) > ∆¯ U(po), and suppose
that p∗ ≤ c.T h e n ∆U(p∗) ≥ ∆U(p = c) > ∆¯ U(po). Hence, at ﬁrm’s optimum, (PCL)m u s tb e
binding and (PCH) is slack. Substituting from (PCL), the ﬁrm’s objective function can therefore
be written as
πH[yH − pqL(p) − ¯ UL(po)+pqH(p) − cqH(p)] + πL[yL + uL(qL) − ¯ UL(po) − cqL(p)].
This means that in the ﬁrm’s optimum, the following ﬁrst order condition must hold:
πH[qH(p∗) − qL(p∗)+q0
L(p∗)(u0










i(p∗) < 0. (a.7)
This immediately yields p∗ >c , which contradicts our initial assumption that p∗ ≤ c. Hence, when
c<c + it must be that p∗ >c , which proves the ﬁrst claim in part (i). The second claim of part (i)
follows in a straightforward way.
The proof of the ﬁrst claim in part (ii) follows the same steps, demonstrating a contradic-
tion in the conjecture that p∗ ≥ pe when c>c + and showing that p∗ does not depend on po.
S i n c et h er e a s o n i n gh e r ei se s s e n t i a l l yt h es a m ea sa b o v e ,w eo m i tt h ed e t a i l s . N o t ea l s ot h a ti f
limpe→0 ∆U(pe) ≤ ∆¯ U(po),t h e n∆U(p = c) ≤ ∆¯ U(po) for all c ≥ 0. This means that part (ii)
always applies, which proves the last claim in the proposition.
When c = c+,s ot h a t∆U(p = c)=∆¯ U(po),t h e nb o t h( P C i) hold with equality. After
substituting into its objective function, the ﬁrm’s problem in this case becomes identical to (EFF),
up to a constant
L X
i=H
πi ¯ Ui(po).T h i sp r o v e sp a r t( i i i ) .¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :(a) If the (OM) constraint p ≤ po does not bind, po only aﬀects the
ﬁrm’s optimization problem through the workers’ reservation utilities. In the proof of Proposition
3, c+ is deﬁned by ∆U(p = c+)=∆¯ U(po).N o w ,∆U(p) decreases in p and is independent of po,
while ∆¯ U(po) decreases in po and is independent of p.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,c+ increases in po.
(b)-(d) Suppose that po ≥ p∗. Then the (OM) constraint does not bind, so that p∗∗ = p∗.T h e
claim that p∗ does not depend on po follows from inspection of the ﬁrst order condition (a.6) (and
its counterpart for c>c +), which is independent of po. This proves part (d). In this case, we have
an interior solution, which means that the perk is always provided, even if po <c .
Now suppose po <p ∗. Then concavity of the ﬁrm’s problem implies that the ﬁrm maximizes
35its proﬁt either by setting p∗∗ = po,b e c a u s ei t sp r o ﬁtm u s tb ei n c r e a s i n gi np at this point, or by
not providing the perk at all. In this case p∗∗ clearly decreases with po, which is claim (c) in the
proposition.
If the perk is provided and p = po, then the (PCi) constraints reduce to s ≥ ¯ si, i = L,H,s o









where so =m a x {¯ si}. If the perk is not provided, then the workers buy the perk good on the outside
market, so that their (PCi) constraints again reduce to s ≥ ¯ si, i = L,H. In this case, the ﬁrm’s





Thus, when po <p ∗,t h eﬁrm will provide the perk if and only if c ≤ po.
To sum up, the above arguments imply that when c ≤ c+,s ot h a tp∗ ≥ c by Proposition 3, then
the perk is provided if and only if po ≥ c.T h a ti s ,ˆ po(c)=c in this case. When c>c +,s ot h a t
p∗ <cby Proposition 3, the perk is provided if and only if po ≥ p∗.I nt h i sc a s e ,ˆ po(c)=p∗ <c .
This concludes the proof of part (b). ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :As we have argued in the text, this problem is equivalent to a formulation
where the ﬁrm chooses arbitrary si and qi but sets the prices pH = pL =0 . To see this, notice that
pi aﬀects the agent’s overall utility and the ﬁrm’s proﬁt only through the term ti = si−piqi.T h u s ,
for any given pi one can ﬁnd an si such that ti remains the same. The equilibrium contract in this
setting, (s∗
i,q∗
i ), would yield the same outcome as a contract of the form (si,q i,p i).
36The ﬁrm’s problem is thus
max
{sH,sL,qH,qL}
πH(yH − sH − cqH)+πL(yL − sL − cqL)
subject to
si + ui(qi) − ¯ Ui(po) ≥ 0,i = H,L, (PCi)
si + ui(qi) ≥ sj + ui(qj),i , j= H,L. (ICi)










µi[si + ui(qi) − sj − ui(qj)]. After some rearranging, the ﬁrst order conditions for
q∗
i and s∗















πH = λH + µH − µL, (a.10)
πL = λL + µL − µH. (a.11)
By µi ≥ 0 and Assumption 1a), (a.8) and (a.9) immediately imply q∗
H ≥ qe
H = c and q∗
L ≤ qe
L = c,
which proves the ﬁrst claim in the proposition.
We now proceed in two steps. First, we characterize the eﬃciency properties of the optimal
quantities and prices as functions of the diﬀerence in the workers’ reservation utilities, ∆¯ U(po).I n
the second step, we ﬁnd the cutoﬀ levels c0 and c00.
Step 1. In this step, we prove the following claim:
(a) If ∆u(qe
















(a) Suppose that ∆u(qe
L) > ∆¯ U(po). First note that both ICi cannot be binding, because
together they would imply ∆u(q∗
H)=∆u(q∗
L), which cannot hold, as ∆u() is a strictly increasing
function. Next, we show that q∗
L <q e
L. Assume to the contrary that q∗
L = qe
L,i nw h i c hc a s eµH =0 .
From (a.10), λH − µL = πH so that λH > 0 and PCH is binding. From the PCi and ICi we have
¯ UH(po)=sH + uH(q∗
H) ≥ sL + uH(qe
L) >s L + uL(qe
L) ≥ ¯ UL(po). Thus, sL ≤ ¯ UH(po) − uH(qe
L) and
sL ≥ ¯ UL(po) − uL(qe
L), so that ¯ Ui(po) ≥ ∆u(qe
L), a n dw eh a v eac o n t r a d i c t i o n .T h e r e f o r e ,i tm u s t
be that q∗
L <q e
L. This implies µH > 0, so that ICH is binding. Since both ICi cannot be binding,




H and suppose to the contrary that q∗
H = qe
H,i nw h i c hc a s eµL =0 , from (a.8).
From (a.11), λL − µH = πL, so that λL > 0 and PCL is binding. From the PCi and ICi we have
¯ UL(po)=sL+uL(q∗
L) ≥ sH +uL(qe
H) and sH +uH(qe
H) ≥ ¯ UL(po).Therefore, sH ≥ ¯ UH(po)−uH(qe
H)
and sH ≤ ¯ UL(po) − uL(qe
H), so that ∆¯ U(po) ≤ ∆u(qe
H) and we have a contradiction. From (a.11),
q∗
H >q e
H implies that µL > 0, which means that ICL is binding. From the proof of (a), both ICi
cannot be binding, so that ICH is nonbinding and µH =0 . The latter implies that q∗
L = qe
L.
(c) Begin by setting q∗
i = qe
i through c = u0
i(qe
i), i = H,L. If we can show that, under the
assumed parametric speciﬁcations, this fully eﬃcient solution satisﬁes the PCi and ICi constraints,
then it is optimal. To this purpose, set s∗
i such that ¯ Ui(po)=s∗
i +ui(qe





H) i fa n do n l yi f¯ UL(po) ≥ ¯ UH(po)−uH(qe
H)+uL(qe
H) w h i c hi nt u r ni st r u e
i fa n do n l yi f∆¯ U(po) ≤ ∆u(qe





only if ¯ UH(po) ≥ ¯ UL(po) − uL(qe
L)+uH(qe
L) w h i c hi nt u r ni st r u ei fa n do n l yi f∆¯ U(po) ≥ ∆u(qe
L).
Step 2. In this step, we translate the above claim into the claims in the proposition.
(i) Fix ∆¯ U(po) > 0 and deﬁne qe
i(c) from u0
i(qe
i)=c. It is clear that qe0
L(c) < 0 and that
38φ(c) ≡ ∆u(qe
L(c)) satisﬁes φ0(c) < 0. Further, we have limc→∞ qe
L(c)=0 , limc→0 qe
L(c)=+ ∞,
limc→∞ φ(c)=0 ,a n dlimc→0 φ(c) > ∆¯ U(po) (by limc→0 φ(c)=l i m q→∞ ∆u(q) > ∆¯ U(po)). Thus,
there is a ﬁnite and positive c0 such that ∆u(qe





L, which means that type H must be charged a price no larger than the perk’s
marginal cost, while type L could pay an above marginal cost price.
For part (ii), ﬁxa∆¯ U(po) > 0 and deﬁne qe
i(c) as in Part (i). Deﬁne Φ(c) ≡ ∆u(qe
H(c)).W e
have limc→∞ qe
H(c)=0 , limc→0 qe
H(c)=+ ∞, limc→∞ Φ(c)=0 ,w i t hqe0
H(c) < 0 and Φ0(c) < 0.
Thus, there exists a ﬁnite and positive c00 >c 0 such that ∆¯ U(po) > ∆u(qe
H(c)) for all c>c 00.B y




L, which means that type H must be charged a below
marginal cost price, while type L pays a price no larger than the perk’s marginal cost. Part (iii)
follows from the proofs of parts (i) and (ii) and from claim (c) in Step 1.
Finally if limq→∞ ∆u(q) ≤ ∆¯ U(po), then because ∆u(q) is increasing in q,w eh a v et h a t∆u(q) ≤
∆¯ U(po) for all q>0. Claim (c) in Step 1 applies and, thus, part (ii) of Proposition 5 holds. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6( s k e t c h ) :(a) The reasoning here is similar to that in the proof of part
(a) in Proposition 4.
(b) The ﬁrm always has the option of setting sL = sH = s and qi = pi(p), i = L,H,f o rs o m e
p, which would yield the same proﬁt as the uniform price contract (s,p). Since Proposition 4 says
that when c>c + the ﬁrm will ﬁnd it optimal to oﬀer the perk under the uniform price contract
even for some po <c , this must also be true in the present case of menu of quantity contracts.
Hence, there must exist a ˜ po(c) <csuch that under the menu of contracts the perk is provided to
at least one type for all po ≥ ˜ po(c). ¥
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